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Abstract  
The present study examined the development and format of children’s mental images. 
Children (4-, 5-, 6-7-, 8-9-, and 11-year-olds) and adults (N = 282) viewed a map of a 
fictitious island containing various landmarks and two misleading signpost markers, 
indicating that some equally distant landmarks were different distances apart. Children as 
young as 5 years showed the linear time-distance scanning effect, which has been well-
documented in adults (Experiments 1 and 2): They took longer to mentally scan their image 
of the island with longer distances between the corresponding landmarks, thus indicating the 
depictive quasi-pictorial nature of children’s mental images. Unlike adults however, their 
scanning times were not affected by the misleading top-down distance information on the 
signposts until age 8 (Experiment 1) unless they were prompted to the difference from the 
outset (Experiment 2). This is the first study to a) provide insight into the format of children’s 
mental images using a mental scanning paradigm and b) show that children’s mental images 
can be susceptible to top-down influences as are adults’. 
 
Keywords: Cognitive development, mental imagery, image scanning, format, visuo-spatial 
processes 
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Mental imagery, “seeing with the mind’s eye” such as “seeing” an event, and object 
or a scene in our mind in the absence of immediate sensory input (Kosslyn, 2006),  is 
ubiquitous in children’s and adults’ every-day life. It has also been of great theoretical debate 
for over 30 years which format our mental images have. In particular, it has been argued that 
mental images are depictive, pictorial-based representations that preserve metric qualities 
such as space and distance (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 2003) or that they 
have no particular format but simply underlie tacit knowledge of how a scene might look 
(Pylyhsyn, 1981; 2002; 2003).  
Depictive theory (Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn et al., 2003) suggests that mental images 
are quasi pictorial in nature and share common features with visual perception such as 
structural representational overlap. There is an “isomorphism” between the spatial structure 
of the representation that occurs during both perception and imagery (Denis & Kosslyn, 
1999). Indeed, Kosslyn (1994) defines depictive representations as “…a type of picture, 
which specifies the locations and values of configurations of points in a space… each part of 
an object is represented by a pattern of points, and the spatial relation among these patterns 
correspond to the spatial relations among the parts ‘themselves’…” (p.5, as cited in Pylyshyn, 
2003). In support of the depictive imagery account, a number of studies have demonstrated 
that adults take longer to scan a mental image as a function of the actual distance between the 
to-be-scanned-objects (e.g., Beech, 1979; Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Borst & Kosslyn, 2010; 
Borst, Kosslyn, & Denis, 2006; Finke & Pinker, 1983; Kosslyn, Ball & Reisser, 1978), which 
also holds for three-dimensional space in mental images (Pinker & Kosslyn, 1978). As this 
effect also occurs in congenitally blind people, a visual perceptual experience is not a 
prerequisite but can also be achieved through haptic experience (Iachini & Ruggiero, 2010). 
Such findings demonstrate that mental images incorporate the metric information present in 
the original object or scene and that newly constructed images are not simply unstructured 
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patterns but possess a structure that has a number of similarities with the structure of 
representations that arise from perception and haptic exploration (Kosslyn et al., 2003).  
Conversely, tacit knowledge theory (Pylyshyn, 2002; 2003) posits that mental images 
do not have any particular format but underlie tacit knowledge. When we imagine a scene or 
an object we consider what it would look like if we saw it. Thus, mental imagery is driven by 
tacit knowledge, the knowledge of what things would look like (Pylyshyn, 2002; 2003). In 
support of this notion, participants do not report certain visual properties in their mental 
image when they are unaware of those properties in the real world and vice versa they do 
report properties when they are aware of them. For example, they focus on a distance 
between two places in a scanning paradigm when instructed to do so but do not represent the 
visuo-spatial properties of scene in their mental images. That is, participants’ performance on 
mental imagery tasks is dependent on how they understand the task or the instructions rather 
than underlying a particular format (Pylyshyn, 1981; 2002; 2003).   
One way of gaining insight into the format of people’s mental images is to ask them 
to scan their mental image of a previously presented image, for example between landmarks 
on an island map (Kosslyn et al., 1978). Findings that adults show a linear time-distance 
relationship (taking longer to scan further distances) are generally interpreted as 
demonstrating the depictive nature of imagery (see Denis & Kosslyn, 1999). However, adults’ 
performance on these tasks has been shown to be penetrable by top-down influences such as 
verbal codes. Scanning times are influenced by misleading mileage signpost markers on the 
map that indicate different distances between the landmarks when actual distances are equal 
(Richman, Mitchell & Reznick, 1979). This indicates that people’s mental scanning 
performance is cognitively penetrable by top-down factors and is often cited in support of the 
tacit knowledge account. Tacit knowledge about perception and understanding of the task 
produces responses like those people believe would occur in the corresponding perceptual 
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situation (Pylyshyn, 1981; 2003). Thus, performance on mental scanning tasks is cognitively 
penetrable by the semantic content of participants’ beliefs and goals (see Pylyshyn, 2003). 
Tacit knowledge theorists argue that if mental images were quasi pictorial in nature they 
would not be influenced by top-down processes and demand characteristics in this way 
(Pylyshyn, 1981, 2003). However, both adults’ and children’s visual perception is cognitively 
penetrable by top-down processes as is evidenced, for example, by visual illusions (Doherty 
& Wimmer, 2005; Gregory, 2009; Long & Toppino, 2004; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). As 
visual perception is guided by knowledge and how we interpret what we see so too is mental 
imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2003). For example, adults reverse (switch) alternative 
interpretations of ambiguous figures in mental imagery when cues of features are provided 
(Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992). Thus, proponents of a 
depictive account argue that mental imagery performance should be penetrable by top-down 
processes as is visual perception (Kosslyn et al., 2003).  
Developmental research may shed more light on the question whether our mental 
images are depictive in nature or based on tacit knowledge and susceptible to top-down 
processes. If it is the case, for example, that 5- to 8-year-olds’ mental imagery retains 
physical properties such as distance, then this would provide support for the depictive 
account since metacognitive strategies and insight develop during this age range (Bjorklund 
& Douglas, 1997; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 2000; Lyons & Ghetti, 2010; Ghetti, Mirandola, 
Angelini, Cornoldi, & Ciaramelli, 2011; Kee, 1994; Perner, Kloo, & Rohwer, 2010; 
Schneider, 1986).  For example, 5-year-olds are much less able to introspect into their own 
thought processes than 8-year-olds (Flavell et al., 2000) and 6-year-olds are less able to 
assess their own subjective experience of recollecting details of events compared to 9-year-
olds (Ghetti et al., 2011). As tacit knowledge such as mental simulation of how a scene might 
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look requires metacognitive insight and strategies, it is unlikely to be applied in 5- to 8-year-
olds.   
Indeed, there are a number of reasons to suspect that younger children’s mental 
images may be depictive in nature. Research from mental rotation in both 5- to 6-year-old 
children and adults demonstrates that response time increases linearly with increasing 
difference in rotation angle between objects (Estes, 1998; Frick, Daum, Walser, & Mast, 
2009; Frick, Möhring, & Newcombe, 2014; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 
1990; Marmor, 1975; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; see also Möring, 
Newcombe, & Frick, 2014 for recent findings of linear increases in spatial scaling). Thus, 
mental images incorporate the spatial information present in the original object. Further, 
adults do not reliably predict a linear rotation effect (Denis & Carfantan, 1985; Lobmaier, 
Mast, & Hecht, 2010) ruling out a tacit knowledge explanation for mental rotation.  
Apart from robust findings in mental rotation, there is limited evidence relevant to the 
question of whether children’s mental images are depictive in nature. Moreover, to our 
knowledge no research to date has examined whether children’s mental imagery performance 
is susceptible to top-down processes. Given that children’s visual perceptual processes are 
influenced by top-down processes (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011), 
one would then also predict top-down influences on children’s mental imagery processes.  
To gain insight into the format of children’s and adults’ mental images we adapted 
Kosslyn et al.’s (1978) famous “island task” and asked participants to scan their mental 
image of a previously presented image between landmarks on an island map. Additionally, 
we examined how distance information on a map (top-down knowledge) affects its 
representation. For example, if one distance between landmarks is labelled as further away on 
a signpost (5 footsteps) than another (1 footstep), will it take children longer to mentally scan 
even though the distances are the same length (see Richman et al., 1979 for adult findings)? 
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Thus, the aim of the present research was first, to examine whether children show the typical 
time-distance linear relationship (taking longer to mentally scan as function of the actual 
distance between the to-be-scanned items), suggesting they preserve metric distance in their 
mental images. Alternatively, if they fail to show the time-distance linear relation this would 
indicate that children’s mental images do not retain spatial properties of a visual scene. This 
will provide us with insight into the format of their images. Second, we ask at what age 
children’s mental images become penetrable to the sort of top-down information that adults’ 
are. If children preserve metric distance in their mental images but their scanning is 
influenced by top-down factors then this strongly favours the idea that children’s mental 
images are similar to visual perception in being pictorial in nature while still influenced by 
conceptual factors.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
In total 152 participants (76 females) took part: 24 4-year-olds (M = 60 months, range 
= 54-65), 26 5-year-olds (M = 71 months, range = 66-77), 26 6-year-olds (M = 83 months, 
range = 78-89), 25 8-year-olds (M = 107 months, range = 99-113), 25 11-year-olds (M = 132 
months, range = 126-137) and 26 adults (M = 21 years, range = 19-31). In both experiments 
children were recruited from local primary schools and adults via the university sign-up 
system and received financial reimbursement. Participants were predominantly from middle-
class backgrounds.  
Materials and procedure  
A map of a fictitious island (see Kosslyn et al., 1978; Richman et al., 1979) was 
constructed on a standard 17.3 inch laptop screen, containing a Lighthouse, Volcano, Hut, 
Pond and Tree (Figure 1). Additionally, two signposts pointed between the Lighthouse-
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Volcano and the Hut-Volcano (both of which were equal distances). Following piloting, the 
signposts were adapted from the 20- and 80-mile ones used by Richman et al. (1979) for 4-5-
year-olds: one signpost showed 1 footstep and the number 1, and the other 5 footsteps and the 
number 5. The positions of the signposts were counterbalanced between the two pairs of 
landmarks between participants.  
 
 
Figure 1. Island map with landmarks and signposts. 
 
Participants were tested individually and introduced to a ‘Percy the Pirate Parrot’ 
character, which walked across a map of a fictitious park. They were told that Percy always 
walked in this way, in a straight line and at the same speed. Participants received three 
practice trials and were asked to close their eyes and, on the experimenter’s ‘Start’ command, 
imagine Percy walking between specified landmarks, and to say ‘Stop’ when he had arrived 
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at the second landmark. After each imagery attempt they watched Percy walking between 
said landmarks, with the instruction to compare this to how they imagined him walking. If 
participants reported that they imagined Percy walking differently, they were questioned on 
this and the instruction to imagine him walking in exactly the same way as they could see 
him walking was repeated.  
In the imagery trials participants viewed the island for 45 seconds. They were 
instructed to name and memorise everything on it. After 45 seconds the landmarks 
disappeared to leave an empty island. To ensure efficient encoding, using the mouse 
participants dragged and dropped each landmark and the two signposts in turn into its correct 
position on the island. Once the landmark was within a 30 pixel radius of its correct location 
it shifted and locked into place. 
The island then disappeared (the younger participants received a cover story about it 
being night-time). Participants were instructed to close their eyes and imagine the island with 
Percy standing at the Lighthouse. They then imagined Percy walking between landmarks in 
the following order (actual distances between each landmarks in parentheses): Lighthouse-
Tree (262mm), Lighthouse-Volcano (81mm), Lighthouse-Pond (154mm), Lighthouse-Hut 
(70mm), Hut-Lighthouse (70mm), Hut-Pond (100mm), Hut-Volcano (81mm), Hut-Tree 
(260mm). The computer recorded the time taken to mentally scan between each of the 
landmark pairs.  
Finally, participants completed ‘perception control’ trials, where this process was 
repeated, but with the island visible on the screen. Participants were instructed to follow their 
eyes between the landmarks to imagine Percy walking between them. After the experiment 
participants were asked what the signs meant and which sign represented further.  
Results Experiment 1 
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Bonferroni confidence interval adjustments and post-hoc analyses were used throughout. 
Outlier response times that were 2 standard deviations from the mean per distance and age 
group were removed.  
Preliminary analyses 
There were no effects of the positions of the signposts (pointing up or down, F(1, 150) 
= 1.92, p = .17, ηp² = .01). To the question about what the signposts were and which one 
meant further, 96% of 4-year-olds, 92% of 5-year-olds, 96% of 6-year-olds, and 100% of 8-, 
11-year-olds and adults responded correctly (e.g., “they’re arrows, that [5 footsteps sign] 
means further because it’s got more footprints” or “that's a sign and it has the number 5 on it 
which means it [the hut] is 5 away from that [the volcano]”). Participants who responded 
incorrectly were excluded from the analysis of the signposts. 
Mental imagery scanning times over different distances 
To control for any effects of the signposts on the time-distance linear relationship, the 
two distances (both 81mm) which had a signpost between each of them were excluded from 
the analysis. Overall, there was an effect of age, F(5, 146) = 3.40, p = .006, ηp² = .10. Four-
year olds took less time to scan than 11-year-olds (p = .01). The other age groups did not 
differ (all ps > .11) (Table 1).  
To examine whether all ages showed a linear increase in scanning times with 
increasing distance, we calculated the best-fitting linear function by the method-of-least-
squares within each age group separately. Scanning times increased linearly with increasing 
distance for all age groups: 4-year-olds, R
2
 = .03, F(1, 142) = 4.26, p = .04; 5-year-olds, R
2
 = 
.17, F(1, 154) = 30.80, p < .001; 6-year-olds, R
2
 = .08, F(1, 154) = 12.52, p < .001; 8-year-
olds R
2
 = .17, F(1, 148) = 30.91, p < .001; 11-year-olds, R
2
 = .27, F(1, 148) = 55.09, p < .001; 
and adults, R
2
 = .53, F(1, 154) = 173.55, p < .001 (Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Mental image scanning task: Overall mean scanning times and association of actual distance 
and scanning time for each age group in Experiment 1. 
Age group 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 8-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
Mean (SD) 7165 
(4534) 
8194 
(3756) 
10583 
(5838) 
10264 
(5122) 
11555 
(4264) 
10307 
(2488) 
Intercept 5385 4077 6815 5254 6093 3944 
β  .17 .41 .27 .42 .52 .73 
t 2.06 5.55 3.54 5.56 7.42 13.17 
p = .04 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta. 
 
However, on closer inspection of the data (see Figure 2), for the 4-year-olds this 
relationship was solely due to a large increase in scanning times between the similar distances 
of 260mm (hut-tree) and 262mm (lighthouse-tree), whilst there was no increase in scanning 
times between the other distances. When scanning times for the 262mm distance (lighthouse 
to tree) were removed from the analyses, 4-year-olds no longer showed a time-distance linear 
relationship, R
2
 = .002, F (1, 118) = .22, p = .64. The model did, however, remain significant 
for all older age groups (all R
2
s > .07, ps < .005). 
To examine the similarity and developmental trajectory of the time-distance-scanning 
relationship across age, we calculated the steepness of the slopes of the best fitting lines (i.e., 
scanning rates) for each participant, and then submitted these slopes to a one-way ANOVA. 
The mean slopes differed between age groups, F(5, 146) = 4.36, p < .001, ηp² = .13. Four-
year-olds’ slopes (B = 11.66 ms/mm) were less steep than 8- (B = 32.78 ms/mm), 11-year-
olds’ (B = 35.78 ms/mm) and adults’ slopes (B = 41.51 ms/mm) (all ps < .05). There were no 
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further slope differences between the remaining age groups (5-year-olds: B = 26.97 ms/mm; 
6-year-olds: B = 24.69 ms/mm), thus, indicating that the scanning time-distance linear 
relationship did not change from age 5 onwards.   
To exclude the possibility that younger children did not show a linear time-distance 
scanning relationship simply because they failed to understand the task, we examined 
perception control scanning times. Scanning times generally increased with age, F(5, 146) = 
11.29, p < .001, ηp² = .28. Specifically, 4- (M = 5821ms), 5- (M = 5992ms), 6- (M = 7941ms) 
and 8-year-olds’ (M = 8522ms) perception control scanning times did not differ (ps > .13). 
Adults (M = 11642ms) took longer to scan than all age groups (ps < .03) except 11-year-olds 
(M = 10679ms) who in turn took longer to scan than both 4- and 5-year-olds (ps < .001). 
All ages showed a linear time-distance relationship (all R
2
s > .08, Fs >11.46, ps < 
.001). Further, comparison of slopes revealed an effect of age, F(5, 146) = 13.59, p < .001, 
ηp² = .32: 4-year-olds’slopes were less steep than all age groups (ps < .03) except 5-year-
olds’. Further adults’ slopes were steeper than all younger age groups (all ps < .001) except 
11-year-olds' (p = .08).  
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Figure 2. Time to scan the different distances for each age group in Experiment 1 
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Effect of signposts on scanning times  
 Finally, we examined the effect of the two signposts on scanning times. A 2 (sign: 1 
vs. 5 footsteps) x 6 (age) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of sign, F(1, 142) = 4.51, p = 
.04, ηp² = .03. Participants showed longer scanning times for the 5 footsteps sign (M = 7841, 
SD = 4453) compared to the 1 footstep sign (M = 7265ms, SD = 3959). There was no main 
effect of age, F(5, 142) = 1.08, p = .382, ηp² = .04, but there was a sign x age interaction, F(5, 
142) = 2.40, p < .05, ηp² = .08. Only 8-, 11-year-olds and adults showed longer scanning 
times for the 5 footsteps sign than the 1 footstep sign, whilst 4-, 5- and 6-year-olds showed no 
difference (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Mean scanning times for each age group for each of the distances showed by the 1 and the 5 
footsteps signposts in Experiment 1. 
Age group 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 8-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
1 footstep 
Mean (SD) 
7500 
(4938) 
6696 
(4411) 
7801 
(4335) 
7510 
(4139) 
7947  
(3307) 
6175 
(2327) 
5 footsteps 
Mean (SD) 
6708 
(5547) 
6230 
(4033) 
8371 
(5023) 
8524 
(5047) 
9263  
(3895) 
7795 
(2201) 
 
 
This pattern was not present on the perception control trials, where there was no effect 
of sign, F(1, 142) = .04, p = .84, ηp² < .001, or sign x age interaction, F(5, 142) = 1.22, p = 
.30, ηp² = .04. Perception control sign-post scanning times increased with age, F(5, 142) = 
5.00, p < .001, ηp² = .15, particularly, between 4-year-olds and both 11-year-olds and adults 
(ps < .04), 5-year-olds and both 11-year-olds and adults (ps < .006).    
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Discussion Experiment 1 
Two important findings emerged from Experiment 1. First, 5- but not 4-year-olds 
clearly showed the linear time-distance scanning effect previously observed in adults, 
indicating that children’s mental images may be depictive in format from a young age. 
Second, children younger than 8 years were not affected by the misleading sign-post 
information, despite understanding what it meant.  
Although a linear-distance relationship was found in mental scanning for all age 
groups, the finding was less robust in 4-year-olds. A possible explanation is that working 
memory demands may have interfered with young children’s scanning more than older age 
groups. This would coincide with improvements in related cognitive processes such as visual 
working memory (e.g., Riggs, McTaggart, Simpson & Freeman, 2006), memory for spatial 
locations (see Plumert & Spencer, 2007), accuracy in coding distance in spatial navigation 
tasks (Bullens, Nardini, Doeller, Braddick, Postma, & Burgess, 2010), and spatial scaling 
abilities (Frick & Newcombe, 2012) (but see Möring, et al., 2014 for linear effects in spatial 
scaling in 4-year-olds). Thus, it is possible that successful scanning emerges between 4 and 5 
years and is driven by developments in working memory capacity. Therefore, 4-year-olds’ 
current scanning times are hard to interpret and no inferences on mental imagery format can 
be drawn for this age group. In contrast, 5 year-olds’ scanning times clearly revealed a linear-
distance relation, indicating that they may preserve metric properties in their mental images. 
To our knowledge this is the first demonstration of a linear time-distance relation in 
children’s mental images in a scanning paradigm. It supports the notion that our mental 
images are depictive in nature (Kosslyn et al., 2003) and that this is already evident in 
children. However, to be fully sure that linear scanning effects imply a quasi-pictorial nature 
of mental images, we need to check whether similar scanning effects emerge when 
participants are not instructed to scan. Therefore, in Experiment 2 a ‘Rapid Verification task’ 
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was implemented (Kosslyn et al., 1978). This  required participants to decide whether two 
landmarks were present rather than to scan between them. If the linear scanning-distance 
effect in the island task genuinely reflects the depictive nature of mental images across ages 
then it should not emerge under rapid verification which does not require mental scanning.       
A further interesting finding from Experiment 1 was that 8-year-olds’ and older 
children’s scanning times were affected by the misleading sign-post information, a 
phenomenon previously found in adults (Richman et al., 1979). Thus, older children’s and 
adult’s mental images are affected by top-down influences. That there was no effect of the 
signposts on scanning times for the perception control task for any of the age groups indicates 
that the difference observed in the imagery trials reflected more than just task demands 
(Pylyshyn, 2003; Richman et al., 1979). Despite being aware of the different distances 
indicated by the sign-posts, participants were not perceptually influenced by their misleading 
content when the landmarks were fully visible during perception control trials. If imagery 
performance underlay tacit knowledge of how a scene looks, then one would expect 
participants to show similar behaviour in both perception and imagery trials. As this was not 
case, a tacit knowledge explanation can be ruled out for the sign-post effects in imagery.  
The question, however, arises why children younger than 8 years were not affected by 
the misleading sign posts. There are three potential explanations for this latter finding, which 
Experiment 2 addresses. Young children may understand the nature of sign-post information 
but not use this information spontaneously in a scanning task. Alternatively, young children 
may have more difficulty thinking simultaneously about the sign-posts and the distance 
information, or children at different ages may weight one source of information over another 
(signposts vs. distance). To address these alternatives, children were prompted towards the 
difference in sign-post distance by asking the conceptual check question (“which one of these 
is further?”) before the scanning trials and were asked to recall what was written on each of 
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the sign-posts (sign-post recall) at the end of the experiment. If children younger than 8 years 
have difficulty thinking simultaneously about sign-posts and distance or weight them 
differently during scanning, then prompting should have no effect. Additionally, if distance 
information is weighted over and above sign-post information one would also expect them to 
have difficulty recalling what was written on the original sign-posts. Alternatively, if young 
children understand the nature of sign-posts but do not spontaneously use this information in 
a distance task then prompting should have an effect and one would expect sign-post effects 
also to emerge in younger children.       
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Overall 130 participants (73 females) took part: 27 5-year-olds (M = 65 months, range 
= 58-73), 27 7-year-olds (M = 87 months, range = 75-93), 26 9-year-olds (M = 114 months, 
range = 107-126), 25 11-year-olds (M = 137 months, range = 128-141), and 26 adults (M = 
37 years, range = 20-70). As in Experiment 1, the youngest children were in their first year of 
formal schooling, and the older groups in their second year and so on, but for Experiment 2 
testing was conducted towards the end of the school year and so the mean ages are somewhat 
higher. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 1 with the following 
three exceptions. The sign-post conceptual question was posed before the imagery trials, a 
‘Rapid Verification task’ was added to the procedure and a sign-post recall phase was 
implemented.  
Island Scanning.  During the 45 second period in which the island was studied and 
its landmarks were named, participants were explicitly prompted towards the difference in 
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sign-post length by asking the conceptual check question, what each signpost meant and 
which one was further. The rest of the procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1.  
 Rapid Verification Task. This followed after the island perception control phase. In 
this task participants heard 10 pre-recorded pairs of words (the first two were practice trials, 
the remaining eight were experimental trials). The first word in each pair was always a 
landmark present on the map (e.g., palm tree). The second word was either a landmark also 
on the map (pond, volcano, hut, palm tree, lighthouse), or a landmark not present on the map 
(waterfall, bushes, cave, rock, umbrella). First, participants viewed the island map for 45 
seconds. Then they were instructed to close their eyes and imagine the map in their heads. 
Once they heard the first word, participants were instructed to 'try and imagine what (e.g.) 
volcano looks like in your head'. They were then told that the second word would be 
something that was either present or not present on the map. The experimenter gave the 
example 'volcano' for something that could be present and 'chair' was the example used for 
something that was not present on the map. Participants were asked to give their own 
examples to check that they understood the task. Then they were presented with the first 
landmark (e.g., palm tree). When they heard the second landmark (e.g., pond) participants 
were instructed to answer, as quickly as they could, 'Yes' if the landmark was on the map or 
'No' if the landmark was not on the map. As soon as the participant had answered the 
experimenter pressed a button on the laptop to indicate a 'yes' or 'no' answer and the second 
practise trial followed. This was then continued with the remaining 8 experimental trials.  
 Sign-Post Recall phase. At the end of the experiment participants were shown a 
power point slide of the two signposts side by side, however, the number and footsteps had 
been removed. The experimenter said 'Look these are the signs you saw on the island earlier. 
Can you remember what was written on them?' Participants’ correct or incorrect recall was 
recorded. 
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Results Experiment 2 
Bonferroni confidence interval adjustments and post-hoc analyses were used throughout. 
Outlier response times that were 2 standard deviations from the mean per distance and age 
group were removed. 
Preliminary analyses 
  To the conceptual question about what the signposts were and which one meant 
further, 96% of 5-year-olds and 100% of the remaining participants responded correctly. 
Additionally in the signpost recall phase, 89% of 5-year-olds, 92% of 7-year-olds, 92% of 9-
year-olds, 88% of 11-year-olds, and 87% of adults, correctly recalled both numbers written 
on the signposts and there was no difference between age groups, F(4, 127) = .16, p = .96, 
ηp² = .005. Participants (N = 17) who responded incorrectly either on the conception check or 
signpost recall or both were excluded from the analysis.  
There were no effects of the positions of the signposts (pointing up or down), F(1, 74) 
= 2.35, p = .13, ηp² = .03. 
Mental imagery scanning times over different distances 
To control for any effects of the signposts on the time-distance linear relationship, the 
two distances (both 81mm) which had a signpost between each of them were excluded from 
the analysis. Scanning time increased with increasing age, F(4, 112) = 11.37, p < .001, ηp² 
=.30. Five-year-olds did not differ from 7-year-olds but took less time to scan than older 
children and adults (all ps < .005) (Table 3). Seven-year-olds were equal to 9-year-olds but 
took less time than both 11-year-olds and adults (ps < .02). There were no differences in 
scanning times from 9-year-olds upwards (all ps > .21).  
To examine the linearity of the distance-scanning time relation, scanning times were 
submitted to linear regressions for each age group separately. Scanning times increased 
linearly with increasing distance for all age groups (Figure 3): 5-year-olds, R
2
 = .12, F(1, 
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135) = 18.67, p < .001; 7-year-olds, R
2
 = .08, F(1, 142) = 11.58, p < .001; 9-year-olds, R
2
 = 
.21, F(1, 139) = 37.02, p < .001; 11-year-olds R
2
 = .11, F(1, 131) = 16.81, p < .001; and 
adults, R
2
 = .42, F(1, 115) = 82.39, p < .001 (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 
Mental image scanning task: Overall mean scanning times and association of actual distance 
and scanning time for each age group in Experiment 2. 
Age group 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
Mean (SD) 6071 
(4175) 
8585 
(4025) 
10644 
(2736) 
13658 
(5987) 
12813 
(4342) 
Intercept 2661 6173 7221 8541 4992 
β  .35 .28 .46 .34 .65 
t 4.32 3.40 6.08 4.10 9.08 
p < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta. 
 
To compare the trajectory of the time-distance-scanning relation between age groups 
(Figure 3), the steepness of the slopes was calculated for each participant and then submitted 
to a one-way ANOVA. The mean slopes differed between age groups, F(4, 112) = 7.19, p < 
.001, ηp² = .21. The three youngest age groups’ slopes (5-year-olds: B = 18.23 ms/mm; 7-
year-olds: B = 19.43 ms/mm; 9-year-olds: B = 22.22 ms/mm) did not differ from each other 
(all ps > .99) but were all less steep than adults’ slopes (B = 50.21 ms/mm) (all ps < .002). 
There was no difference between 10-year-olds’ slopes (B = 35.97 ms/mm) and the remaining 
age groups (all ps > .13) (Table 3).  
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 A similar result pattern to the imagery trials was found for perception control trials. 
Scanning times generally increased with age, F(4, 111) = 32.42, p < .001, ηp² = .55, where 5-
year-olds (M = 3449ms) scanned faster than all older age groups (ps < .001) except 7-year-
olds (M = 6520ms, p = .10) who in turn scanned faster than all older age groups (ps < .003). 
Moreover, 9-year-olds (M = 10795ms) scanned faster (ps < .05) than both 11-year-olds (M = 
14216ms) and adults (M = 14627ms) where the latter two did not differ. All ages showed a 
linear time-distance relationship (all R
2
s > .08, Fs >12.27, ps < .001). Further, comparison of 
slopes revealed an effect of age, F(4, 110) = 30.72, p < .001, ηp² = .56. Slopes increased in 
steepness between all adjacent age groups (all ps < .05) except between 5- and 7-year-olds (p 
= 1) and 11-year-olds and adults (p = .16).  
Effect of signposts on scanning times  
 Finally, the effect of the two signposts on scanning times was examined. A 2(sign: 1 
vs. 5 footsteps) x 5(age) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of sign, F(1, 71) = 21.00, p < 
.001, ηp² = .23. Participants showed longer scanning times for the 5 footsteps sign (M = 7686, 
SD = 3383) compared to the 1 footstep sign (M = 6176ms, SD = 2128). There was a main 
effect of age, F(4, 71) = 8.96, p < .001, ηp² = .34, where 5-year-olds scanned equally fast as 
7-year-olds but faster than 9-, 11-year-olds and adults (all ps < .004) (Table 4). Additionally 
7-year-olds scanned faster than adults (p = .01). There were no further differences between 
age groups (all ps > .10). There was no sign x age interaction, F(4, 71) = .29, p =.88, ηp² = 
.02 (Table 4).  
On the perception control trials, there was no effect of sign, F(1, 100) = .02, p = .90, 
ηp² < .001, or sign x age interaction, F(1, 100) = 1.67, p = .16, ηp² = .06.  Participants’ 
perception control signpost scanning times increased with age, F(4, 100) = 31.30, p < .001, 
ηp² = .56, particularly between 5-year-olds and all older age groups (all ps < .001) except 7-
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year-olds. Signpost control scanning time also increased between 7-year-olds and all older 
age groups (all ps < .001) and between 9-year-olds and adults (p < .001).  
 
Table 4 
Mean scanning times for each age group for each of the distances showed by the 1 and the 5 
footsteps signposts in Experiment 2. 
Age group 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
1 footstep 
Mean (SD) 
4337 
(1920) 
5341 
(1615) 
7285 
(2076) 
7141  
(1327) 
7773 
(914) 
5 footsteps 
Mean (SD) 
5653 
(3497) 
6953 
(3131) 
8787 
(2617) 
8226  
(2494) 
10090 
(3817) 
 
Rapid verification  
Accuracy. All age groups performed at ceiling in verifying whether a landmark was 
present or not (5-year-olds: M = .97; 7-year-olds: M = .98; 9-year-olds: M = .99; 11-year-
olds: M = 1.00; Adults: M = 1.00), therefore, no further statistical analyses were conducted. 
Response Time. Age differences in mean response times in landmark verification 
were examined in a one-way ANOVA. Participants’ response times decreased with age, F(4, 
129) = 7.84, p < .001, ηp² = .20, where 5-year-olds (M = 912 ms) responded more slowly than 
all older age groups (9-year-olds: M = 313 ms; 11-year-olds: M = 227 ms; adults: M = 193 
ms) (ps < .002) except 7-year-olds (M = 646 ms) who in turn responded more slowly than 
adults (p = .05). The remaining age groups did not differ.  
For the 4 test trials containing landmark pairs that were present, we examined whether 
there was a relation between landmark verification times and their distance on the map. There 
were no linear increases in verification times with increasing distance for all age groups: 5-
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year-olds, R
2
 = .06, F(1, 115) = .45, p = .50; 7-year-olds, R
2
 = .05, F(1, 103) = .30, p = .58; 9-
year-olds, R
2
 = .15, F(1, 103) = 2.18, p = .14; 11-year-olds R
2
 = .08, F(1, 91) = .55, p = .46; 
and adults, R
2
 = .06, F(1, 103) = .39, p = .53. Thus, when the task requires verification rather 
than mental scanning, the linear time-distance relation disappeared.    
Discussion Experiment 2 
As in Experiment 1 findings revealed a linear increase in scanning time with increasing 
distance across all age groups from age 5 onwards, suggesting that when children and adults 
scan a scene they preserve metric properties in their mental images. This interpretation is 
further strengthened by the finding that when the task does not require scanning but 
verification of whether a landmark was or was not present (rapid verification task), then the 
linear time-distance effect disappears. This lack of effect was found for all child age groups 
and adults and adds to results from the adult literature so far demonstrating these effects in 
adults (Kosslyn et al., 1978). Taken together findings across both experiments indicate that 
children’s mental images are quasi-pictorial in nature, previously only documented in adult 
scanning tasks (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Borst & Kosslyn, 2010; Kosslyn et al., 1978; 
Kosslyn et al., 2003).   
 One difference from Experiment 1 is that overall scanning time increased with age in 
both imagery and perception trials whereas in Experiment 1 only 4-year-olds, who did not 
show a linear increase, differed in absolute scanning times. This was somewhat unanticipated 
but because 5- and 7-year-olds scanned faster in both imagery and scanning trials, it may 
suggest that their representation of Percy the Pirate’s speed was faster than that of older 
children and adults. Moreover, the finding of a decrease in response time with age in rapid 
verification suggests that younger children are not faster per se but supports the notion that 
young children differ in their speed representation (Gross, Soken, Rosengren, Pick, Pillow, & 
Melendez, 1991; Smits-Engelsman & Wilson, 2013). 
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 In contrast to Experiment 1, when participants were prompted to the difference in 
signpost distances before the imagery trials, then 5- to 8-year-olds’ scanning times were also 
affected by the misleading signpost information. This finding, together with the lack of an 
effect in these age groups in Experiment 1, indicates that young children do not use 
conceptual information such as signposts spontaneously in a distance task but require 
prompting to do so. Thus, children younger than 8 years have apriori no difficulty in thinking 
simultaneously about signposts and distance. Further, as children had no difficulties in 
recalling what was written on the original signposts (signpost recall) it is unlikely that they 
weight distance and signpost information differently during scanning. Overall, findings of 
Experiment 2 suggest that even 5-year-olds’ mental scanning performance can be susceptible 
to top-down factors. The notion that this signpost effect reflects susceptibility to top-down 
factors in mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2003) rather than task demands (Pylyshyn et al., 
2003) is further strengthened by the finding that participants were not susceptible to the 
misleading signposts under perception control when the island was fully visible.  
 General Discussion 
To our knowledge this is the first study to provide insight into the format of children’s 
mental images in a mental scanning paradigm. First, by age 5 children show the time-distance 
scanning effect previously observed in adults, indicating that they represent images 
depictively from a young age. This supports the notion that young children preserve spatial 
properties in their mental image, previously found in mental rotation paradigms (Estes, 1998; 
Frick, et al., 2009; Frick et al., 2014; Kosslyn, et al., 1990; Marmor, 1975) and in a recent 
study on spatial scaling (Möring, et al., 2014). Second, young children’s mental imagery 
performance can be affected by top-down influences, indicating that their mental images are 
susceptible to conceptual factors.  
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No research to date has examined if and when young children show the linear time-
distance scanning relationship in their mental scanning. That the 4-, but not the 5-year-olds, 
failed to show a linear-time distance relationship (Experiment 1) indicates that the ability to 
scan mental images undergoes rapid developments around this age. It is possible that this 
youngest age group had difficulty holding the island map in mind whilst scanning at the same 
time, and this coincides with improvements in related cognitive processes such as visual 
working memory (e.g., Riggs, et al., 2006), memory for spatial locations (Plumert & Spencer, 
2007), coding distance in spatial navigation tasks (Bullens, et al., 2010), and the ability to 
scale distances (Frick & Newcombe, 2012; Möring, et al., 2014). The developmental 
cognitive mechanisms underlying why 4-, but not 5-year-olds’ scanning performance is so 
poor is an interesting avenue for future research.  
While children showed a linear time-distance relationship from age 5, their imagery 
performance was also susceptible to top-down influences such as misleading distance 
markers when prompted towards the distance difference (Experiment 2). The finding that 
there was no effect of the signposts on scanning times for the perception control task 
(Experiments 1 and 2) also indicates that the difference we observed in the imagery trials 
reflects more than just task demands (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2003; Richman et al., 1979). Overall, 
this indicates an early reliance on the perceptual properties of images during mental imagery, 
with children utilising conceptual information in their mental imagery performance as 
previously found analogously in visual perceptual phenomena such as visual ambiguous 
stimuli (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). Thus, not only is adults’ 
mental imagery performance susceptible to top-down influences (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; 
Peterson, et al., 1992) but also children’s (current experiments) and this emerges as soon as 
children show the linear time-distance scanning effect.   
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The developmental approach makes unique contributions to the imagery debate of 
whether the time-distance scanning relationship shown in the island task is simply a result of 
task demands (Pylyshyn, 2002; 2003), with participants inferring from the experimental 
situation the expected results and using their tacit knowledge about times and distance or 
underlies mental representation of spatial properties (Kosslyn et al., 1978; Kosslyn et al., 
2003). Because metacognitive abilities are still developing (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987; Bjorklund 
& Douglas, 1997; Flavell et al., 2000; Kee, 1994), it is unlikely that particularly younger 
children would succumb to the task demands and perform the task by imagining how it would 
look  if they saw it, as Pylyshyn (2002; 2003) argues. Thus, our findings indicate that 
children are in fact preserving metric properties in their mental images rather than simply 
applying their tacit knowledge and this is already the case for 5-year-olds; the age at which 
their mental images also begin to be influenced by top-down processes. In sum, this research 
provides an important contribution to theory for understanding the format and development 
of mental scanning. 
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